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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of JAMES 
JOHN LATSIS (sometimes known as 
"Latses"), 
Deceased. 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
FACTS 
We will concern ourselves briefly with some funda-
mental facts of record, which have a bearing upon the 
basic matters of law discussed under the points briefed 
here. 
After the probate involved here had proceeded from 
Feb. 19,1944 (R. 6) to Feb. 13,1945, all of the heirs, some 
acting in person and some by their representative ap-
pointed under 75-14-25, U.C.A., agreed upon a division 
of the estate among them, and upon the portion thereof 
each was entitled to, and which each would accept as his 
or her share. They joined in a petition (R. 86) so repre-
senting to the Court and asking the Court to determine 
that the proposed division was a fair one, and recited 
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(R. 87), "That the Court * * * shall direct the manner of 
distribution of the said fund." 
While the stipulation recited that "it has been agreed 
* * * subject to the approval of the Court, that the said 
payment and settlement shall become binding and con-
clusive as to each upon acceptance of his portion * * * 
and the execution of the necessary instruments to receipt 
therefor and to assign his said interest and release the 
said estate, * * *" (R. 87) it did not say that this was a 
condition, or that it was not to become binding until these 
things were done. In fact, the stipulation said, in addition, 
to saying that what was recited was "subject to the ap-
proval of the Court," that, as stated above, the Court 
would "direct the manner of distribution." 
If these were conditions, the Court did not adopt 
them as such, or at all, and did not so limit the distribu-
tion. It is plain that neither the Court nor any of the 
parties to the estate nor their attorneys ever regarded 
these provisions as conditions at any time during this 
probate proceeding. All the subsequent proceedings in-
dicate the contrary. 
In any event, the trial Court in its order pursuant 
to the petition (R. 90) made a plain, direct and present 
distribution to each and all heirs (R. 96-7) with no con-
dition mentioned, and the only reference to its afterward 
becoming binding upon anybody was the statement in the 
order that the "distribution shall be binding * * * as to 
each * * * upon acceptance by him, or by his heirs-at-law 
of said payments." 
And then to make its acceptance certain, the Court 
o 
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(E. 97) directly "Ordered that the said heirs shall fur-
nish proper receipts therefor and relinquishments of all 
interests in the estate and release of the administrators 
herein * * *." 
There is other language emphasizing the intention 
of the Court to make a present and unconditioned distri-
bution and to insure that the heirs would receive their 
share, such as that charging the appellants' attorney rep-
resentative with the duty of getting the money to these 
heirs and taking their receipts therefor, and in authoriz-
ing the payment of his fees in full (E. 96) upon such 
distribution being completed, and also reciting that the 
delivery of checks for the making of such distribution, 
"shall relieve the administrators herein from further re-
sponsibility." There seems to be nothing conditional 
in this February order, and little room for interpretation 
there, and there is none whatsoever in the final decree 
entered about eight months later. 
This final decree, October 4, 1945, recites the full 
statutory administration of the estate, full satisfaction 
of all claims and other obligations, except a balance on 
the distribution due to heirs under the order of February 
27,1945 (E, 109), and says that funds have been provided 
and deposited to take care of this by the widow. There 
was filed an acknowledgement (E. 121) by the bank of 
the receipt of the funds to be used for the purpose of 
completing the delivery by the heirs' attorney representa-
tive. 
The decree seems to refer to the February order for 
the purpose only of stating the amount due the foreign 
3 
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heirs thereunder, and then stating its approval of the 
"foregoing" provisions made for funds to comply there-
with. It contains no approval of the order of February 
27 as the opinion here seems to say, and it contains no 
intimation that the former order was a conditional one. 
On the contrary/ after approving the aforesaid provi-
sions, it recites that the estate is in condition to be closed . 
and then discharges the administrators, and then closes 
it completely. 
It would appear to have no legal bearing upon the 
force or effect of this decree if the decree had mentioned 
any earlier understanding or representation to the Pro-
bate Court as to receipts being required from heirs. 
It may be added, however, that this final decree makes 
no mention of any such matter. It certainly does not 
condition its immediate effect upon these, and, of much 
greater importance, it contains no condition wthin itself 
as to its not then becoming effective. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
THIS DECREE IS A FINAL AND VALID JUDGMENT 
AND NOT A VOID ONE. 
P O I N T 2. 
A DECREE CANNOT BE SET ASIDE UNTIL ASSAILED 
IN THE MANNER AND WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED 
BY LAW, AND IN AN ACTION AGAINST ALL PARTIES 
WHO WOULD BE AFFECTED BY SETTING IT ASIDE. 
P O I N T 3. 
WHAT RELIANCE, IF ANY, MAY NOW BE PLACED 
UPON 75-14-25 U.C.A., 1953? 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THIS DECREE IS A FINAL AND VALID JUDGMENT 
AND NOT A VOID ONE. 
The opinion here says only (270 P. 2d at 974) that 
"the decree of distribution and order discharging the ad-
ministrator * * * was conditional * * *." However, the 
effect of that opinion is to make the decree wholly void. 
Tested by all the standards heretofore relied upon, 
particularly in testing decrees affecting real property, 
this was and is a conclusive and binding decree, and not 
a void one. 
Some of these standards heretofore established and 
relied upon will be briefly referred to: 
First, there is no lack of jurisdiction of the property 
and of all the parties. This Court held in Barrette v. 
Whitney, 106 P. 522, approving Snyder v. Murdoch, 73 P. 
22, that probate proceedings are "in their nature m rem" 
and that 
"the notice which is given upon the filing of the 
petition for letters of administration is the juris-
dictional notice, the giving of which, * * * brings 
not only the property, but the persons interested 
therein, within the jurisdiction of the Court." 
Later, in Weyant v. Ut. Sav. & Trust Co., 182 P. 189, 
9 A.L.R. 1119 at 1129, this Court said: 
"This Court is committed to the doctrine * * * 
that probate proceedings are in rem, and that 
where the statutory notice has been given, all who 
are interested in the estate are bound by all orders 
or decrees duly entered in a particular case, and 
that, ordinarily, the only remedy is by direct ap-
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
^^k 
peal." * * * "The Court has also held that judg-
ments and decrees entered by Courts of competent 
jurisdiction, where jurisdictions of the subject 
of the action and of the person has been legally 
acquired, can only be assailed on direct appeal 
or in equity for extrinsic as contradistinguished 
from intrinsic fraud. Cantwell v. Thatcher Bros., 
47 U. 150,151 P. 986." 
Such general jurisdiction is not questioned here, and 
under 75-1-7 and 8, and 75-14-12, U.C.A., it cannot be. 
It may be added that as to property over which 
the Court has jurisdiction and as to all parties to a pro-
bate proceedings, such a judgment as we have here is 
conclusive. 
31 Am. JUT., p. 101: 
"449. Conclusiveness. — Judgments in rem 
are regarded as conclusive by the courts. Indeed, 
the rule limiting the conclusiveness of a judgment 
to the parties to the proceeding in which it was 
rendered, and their privies, has been subjected to 
an exception in the case of a judgment m rem, 
which, the court having jurisdiction, is binding on 
third persons, or on all parties in interest, or, 
as it is frequently said, on the whole world." 
This Court has so held: 
In Snyder v. Murdoch, 73 P. 22, the Court held a 
decree of distribution final, even though it distributed 
exempt property of the estate to a judgment creditor 
who, it was claimed in this case, was not entitled thereto. 
In Tiller v. Norton, 253 P. 2d 618, it was held that the 
decree of distribution was final and conclusive even 
though it took away entirely the inheritance of two known 
6 
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children of the decedent and made no provision for them. 
It was also held again that such decree could be attacked 
only upon allegation and proof of extrinsic fraud. 
The conclusiveness of decrees and orders in probate, 
as well as the importance of making such conclusive, has 
been emphasized by a number of Utah decisions as well 
as the decisions of Courts generally. This Court has ap-
plied the provisions of 75-11-37 generally to probate 
orders and decrees. This section reads: 
"75-11-37. Conclusiveness of Settlement — 
The settlement of the account, and the allowance 
thereof by the court or upon appeal, is conclusive 
against all persons in any way interested in the 
estate, saving, however, to all persons laboring 
under any legal disability their right to move for 
cause to reopen and examine the account, or to 
proceed by action against the executor or adminis-
trator, either individually or upon his bond, at any 
time before final distribution; * * *." 
Utah cases so applying the provisions of this section 
generally to orders and decrees in probate have been sum-
marized in the annotation to this section. 
In re Bice's Estate, 182 P. 2d 111, at 117. There this 
Court, in a case alleging a failure to distribute the prop-
erty of the estate properly to an heir entitled thereto, 
cites some of these cases, and states the law, as follows: 
"A decree of distribution in probate proceed-
ings after due and legal notice, by a court having 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, is conclusive 
as to the fund, property, items and matters cov-
ered by and properly included within the decree, 
until set aside or modified by the court entering 
the decree in the manner prescribed by law, ox 
7 
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until reversed on appeal. See In re Evans et al., 
42 Utah 282,130 P. 217. 
"In the case of In re Baleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 
128, 158 P. 705, 709, this court held that an exe-
cutor's or administrator's account has the same 
force and effect as a final judgment and is conclu-
sive as to all items included therein, where the 
statutory requirement of notice has been complied 
with/ and where, as here, the heir is not laboring 
under some legal disability. Further, in connec-
tion with the procedure to assail an account, the 
court said: 
" 'It is apparent, therefore, that an exe-
cutor's or administrator's account which has 
been allowed can be assailed only in equity 
and upon the same grounds as other judg-
ments. * * *'" 
The Court then cites and quotes Section 102-11-37, 
UCA, 1943, which is the same as 75-11-37 above quoted. 
The case held that extrinsic fraud had been alleged and 
established and this was the ground of the relief granted. 
In re Linford's Estate (Utah) 239 P. 2d 200: 
a* # * ^ g hereinabove stated, decrees of the 
probate court can be assailed only in equity and 
upon the same grounds as other judgments. In re 
Kaleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128, 158 P. 705; in re 
Brooks' Estate, 83 Utah 506, 30 P. 2d 1065; and 4 
Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d Ed., Sec, 1011, et 
sequi." 
# # * 
"We rule that the decree of summary distri-
bution, having been procured in good faith, and 
no fraud having been proved, is conclusive against 
the petitioners as to the property included in the 
original inventory...." 
8 
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In Intermill v. Nash, 75 P. 2d 157, this Court again 
discusses the matter of conclusiveness of judgments 
where titles are involved. This case is an effort to avoid 
a judgment entered in foreclosure. The plaintiff brought 
an action to quiet title to real property involved. She 
had purchased the property from Hoffman Bros, over a 
period of 14 years commencing in 1910. She received 
a deed in 1924. She had paid the taxes from 1910 to 1929 
and her name and address appeared in the deed to her 
which was of record, and also in the assessment records. 
Hoffman, prior to her deed, had mortgaged the prop-
erties to the predecessor of defendant Nash and she had 
brought foreclosure proceedings and served or pretended 
to serve summons upon the plaintiff by publication in a 
Salt Lake newspaper, without a sufficient affidavit of the 
jurisdictional facts authorizing such service. 
In her answer in this action to quiet title, the de-
fendant denied that plaintiff was the owner, and in a 
counterclaim alleged that she was the owner, and that 
plaintiff had no title or interest, and sought to quiet title 
in herself. 
To this counterclaim, plaintiff filed an answer stat-
ing the facts above as to her purchase from Hoffman 
Bros., etc., and attacking the judgment of foreclosure 
as a cloud upon her title. Upon the trial, the District 
Court sustained objection to the offer by plaintiff of the 
affidavit to procure service of summons by publication 
upon the ground that it was an attempted collateral at-
tack upon the foreclosure judgment. This Court, in a 
unanimous opinion, held that it was such, and, pointing 
9 
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out the importance of maintaining the validity and in-
tegrity of judgments "where property rights are involved, 
said: 
"The courts, functioning to determine and 
settle property rights, upon which persons may 
rely and the security of society be built, should 
enjoy, in their formal pronouncements, every pos-
sible degree of conclusiveness. To permit their de-
terminations to be lightly regarded or easily 
evaded would render them nugatory, and be a 
source of litigation and friction rather than to 
put an end thereto." 
# # # 
"A judgment, once entered by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, having the res and the parties 
duly brought before it as provided by law, imports 
verity, proves itself, and is invulnerable to attacks 
by any indirect assaults. It can only be questioned 
in the manner and the proceedings established 
by law. And since a judgment is established and 
proved by the record thereof, unless an inspection 
of that record establishes its invalidity, shows it to 
be void, the judgment is conclusive and may not be 
questioned collaterally by any matters dehors the 
record thereof. Amy v. Amy, 12 Utah 278, 42 P. 
1121, 1124; Hoagland v. Hoagland, 19 Utah 103, 
57 P. 20; Liebhart v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 
P. 215." 
The opinion proceeds and points out that, "a judg-
ment that is voidable cannot be attacked collaterally." 
It also says: 
"Any question, therefore, as to jurisdiction 
or as to the validity of the judgment, which does 
not show up on the face of the record, must be 
raised and brought to the attention of the Court 
by appropriate pleadings." 
10 
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The Court alludes to the delay upon the part of 
plaintiff in proceeding to assert title for over six years, 
knowing that the defendant was claiming the property 
and says: 
"By the provisions of 6619, Comp. Laws 1917, 
she had one year after entry of judgment, or until 
May, 1930, still more than six months in which 
to apply to the Court for leave to be heard on the 
merits." 
The concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe, at page 164 
of the report, states some principles applicable here: 
"* * * I see no reason why in a suit based on 
a purported judgment or defended on the strength 
of a supposed judgment which is null, it may not 
be avoided in the same suit in which such judg-
ment is to be introduced and used by laying the 
proper foundation for introducing evidence of the 
voidness of the supposed judgment, * * * But so 
jealous is the law of its judgments recorded as 
such, that only such type of direct attack can be 
made when it is claimed the judgment is void, not 
when it is only voidable, and only can evidence 
be introduced of its voidness when the pleadings 
set up wherein it is void. The one exception is, 
of course, where the judgment is void on its face." 
# # # 
"But where its voidness is not self-revealed, 
the pleadings must set out wherein and why it is 
void." 
The foregoing case was approved in Glenn v. Rich, 
147 P. 2d 849, where at page 851, the opinion by Judge 
Wolfe, says: 
"The defendant next contends that the trial 
court erred in finding that the guardianship pro-
11 
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ceeding was void. The attach on the order ap-
pointing a guardian is a collateral one for it is a 
denial of the legal and binding effect of a judg-
ment in a proceeding not instituted for the pur-
pose of annulling or changing it. See Mosby v. 
Gisborn, 17 Utah 257, 281, 54 P. 121; Intermill v. 
Nash, 94 Utah 271, 75 P. 2d 157. Unless the pro-
ceedings show on their face that the court was 
without jurisdiction to make the order of appoint-
ment or to conduct the proceedings leading there-
to, the appointment of a guardian cannot be ques-
tioned in such a collateral proceeding. 25 Am. Jur. 
p. 35, Sec. 49." 
Later, in the case of Zions Ben. Bldg. Soc. v. Geary, 
et al., 189 P. 2d at 966, this Court in an opinion by Justice 
Pratt again approved the decision in Intermill v. Nash, 
supra. 
Not a Conditional Decree: 
As stated above, this decree is in fact held to be void. 
This holding comes by reason of a statement in the opin-
ion that, "The decree was conditioned on these acts being 
done which condition has not been satisfied." This state-
ment is preceded immediately by mistaken statements 
as to what the decree itself says. 
The Court, although mistaken as to this, recognizes 
a principle of law which appears to be universal, that a 
judgment to be a conditional one must itself contain the 
condition, such as, a condition which must be satisfied 
in order for it to come into effect, or a condition by which 
its effectiveness shall be terminated. There is plainly 
no condition contained in this judgment. 
The errors in this respect have been demonstrated 
12 
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in some detail and we believe correctly, at pages 15 to 
25 of the Ut. Sav. & Trust Company's petition for rehear-
ing. A careful reading of this final decree discloses no 
condition as to the effect or the finality of the decree; 
no condition as to when or how it shall take effect; and 
no condition by which it may be rendered ineffective. It 
seems important and fundamental here that what is re-
ferred to as a condition — that is, the giving of receipts 
and releases — is not mentioned in the decree, and fur-
thermore that this is something which the appellants 
had been directly ordered by the Court to do. 
Parish v. McConkie, Bis. Ct. Judge, 35 Pac. 2d 1001, 
is a case in this State in which this Court has discussed 
the question of "alternative or conditional" judgments. 
In that case, a judgment was entered in a divorce pro-
ceedings by which the defendant husband was ordered to 
"transfer and deliver to the said plaintiff stock in the 
Western Loan and Building Company of the present 
cash value of $2,900.00, or in lieu thereof shall assign, 
transfer, set over and deliver to said plaintiff life insur-
ance certificates having a present cash value of the same 
amount, or in lieu thereof shall deliver to the said plain-
tiff $2900.00 in cash." Defendant had apparently dis-
posed of the stocks and certificates mentioned, and upon 
citation for failure to comply with this order, was sen-
tenced for contempt for failure to pay the $2900.00 in 
cash. This Court, upholding this, said: 
"A judgment in the alternative gives the right 
of option to the judgment debtor and his election 
is binding upon the judgment creditor. State ex 
13 
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rel Gordon v. Smith, 98 Wash. 100, 167 P. 91,169 
P. 468. * * * the judgment settling property rights 
is final and a bar to any action afterwards brought 
by either party to determine the question of prop-
erty rights. Smith v. Smith, 77 Ut. 60, 291 P. 298 
and cases there cited." 
The Court then refers to some authorities cited that a 
judgment cannot be alternative or conditional and says 
that as applied to the facts in the case that was cited, 
the statement would be correct, and then adds: 
"But as in contracts, a condition sure to 
happen or an alternative one or the other of which 
a party is bound to elect, the happening or election 
making the judgment absolutely certain and defi-
nite eliminates the condition. For example: 
Thirty days from this date plaintiff shall be en-
titled to recover $1,000 is not a judgment, while, 
plaintiff shall have and recover $1,000, payable 
30 days from the date hereof, is a judgment." 
This is because in the latter case he is "bound" to pay 
it, but it is no more certain that defendant was bound 
there than that the appellants are bound to give the re-
ceipts and instruments referred to here. The order 
(E. 97) above quoted is direct and positive. Certainly, 
a party cannot upset a judgment on the ground that he 
refuses to comply with an order made therein, and con-
tend that by his election to refuse to obey the order, it 
becomes void. 
If there were ever any conditions in this probate 
proceedings at all, such things were in proposals of the 
parties long prior to the final decree. These things — 
claimed to be conditions—were not carried as such even 
14 
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into the prior order entered upon such proposals; but 
these things, instead of being perpetuated as conditions, 
were there ordered to be done and performed. They are 
not even referred to or mentioned in the final judgment 
of distribution and discharge. Judgments cannot be re-
lied upon if they may be destroyed at any remote time 
by such incidental outside matters. 
In 31 Am. Jur., p. 93, Sec. 433? it is said: 
"Conditions to a judgment may be annexed 
by the Court in certain cases, and such judgments 
are known as 'conditional judgments.' Where the 
findings order a judgment giving one party an 
alternative, such party need not indicate his choice 
of alternatives until the judgment is entered." 
Instances involving conditional judgments which 
were enforced are cited by this author, and we call at-
tention to some of these to illustrate that a condition to 
operate as such is in the judgment itself: 
It has been held that in actions to expel foreign cor-
porations found guilty of violations, the Court, by pro-
vision therein, may insert a condition that the decree 
shall take effect at a future time fixed. 16 Am. Jur., p. 
676. 
It has been said that a garnishee judgment upon the 
default of a garnishee who has failed to appear may be 
conditioned upon his being indebted to the debtor in the 
principal judgment. 5 Am. Jur., p. 75. 
In actions to enforce oil and gas leases the Court 
may make an alternative or conditional decree reciting 
that the defendant shall forfeit unless specified acts are 
performed. 24 Am. Jur., p. 665. 
15 
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In specific performance cases, it is within the dis-
cretion and power of equity courts to condition specific 
performance of a contract upon the performance of the 
conditions that the party seeking specific performance 
is required to perform, such as the return of money, and 
to require therein that unless such payment be made into 
Court within a specified time, the proceeding will be 
dismissed. 49 Am. Jur. p. 201. 
The author, under the above quotation, also cites 
Coir on v. Mellandon, 19 How. 113,15 L. Ed. 575, where it 
was held that in setting aside a deed for fraud, a decree 
could be conditioned by a provision therein for the return 
of the purchase money upon giving the reconveyance. 
Not only do we find no condition stated in the decree 
here, but there is not the slightest indication that the 
Court considered such matter at all or that there was 
any occasion to consider it. And there seems to be no 
ambiguity in the decree, so as to call for or permit inter-
pretations of it, and if there were, as stated in Interrrdll 
v. Nash, supra, this would require pleadings and evidence. 
And the rule of interpretation seems to be (see 30 
Am. Jur., p. 834) that "judgments are to be construed 
like other written instruments. The determinative factor 
is the intention of the court * * V It isn't necessary to 
mention that if two interpretations were permissible the 
one giving validity to a decree or contract is the one to 
be adopted. 
On the above matter as to conditions which may limit 
a decree taking effect, or which terminate its effective-
ness, this Court has recently said something informative 
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here, and which is in line with what we have just above 
said, 
Preas v. Phebus, 272 P. 2d 159, involved conditions 
in a written instrument and in discussing these the opin-
ion at page 162, said: 
"(2-5) In other words, the parties differ as 
to whether the language used in Exhibit C estab-
lishes an estate upon condition subsequent or an 
estate subject to a conditional limitation. The dis-
tinction is that in the case of a condition subse-
quent the assignor is given the right Ho secure a 
revesting of the former estate, so that, if no steps 
are taken to secure a revesting, the estate granted 
remains as before, while the happening of the 
event described by a conditional limitation ipso 
facto determines the estate.' 51 A.L.B. 1473." 
This note discussing this matter says: 
"The distinction between an estate upon con-
dition subsequent and one subject to a conditional 
limitation (sometimes characterized as 'a condi-
tion in law') is that in the case of the former the 
words creating the condition do not originally 
limit the term, but merely permit its termination 
upon the happening of the contingency, while in 
the case of the latter the words creating it limit 
the continuation of the estate to the time preced-
ing the happening of the contingency." 
In any event, it seems clear, that judgments are 
neither conditional because of, nor should their validity 
be made to depend upon, interpretations of some prior 
understandings or representations not mentioned therein, 
or ever made of record. Probate decrees affecting real 
property "should enjoy" complete dependability. Section 
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75-14-15, U. C. A. as to the required contents of decrees 
in probate says that "it shall only be necessary that they 
contain the matters ordered and adjudged," therein; and 
then 75-14-16 says as to a decree "determining any matter 
affecting the title to real property a certified copy * * * 
must be recorded * * *; and from the time of filing * * * 
notice of the contents thereof is imparted to all persons." 
Then, 17-21-10 requires County Recorders to record all 
such decrees. 
The matters "ordered and adjudged" as to the distri-
bution of the properties of this estate are set forth in this 
decree, without any limitations; and the recorded de-
cree gave the notice, and was relied upon as contemplated 
by these statutes. And this Court said in Intermill v. 
Nash, supra, such decrees affecting real property "upon 
which persons may rely and the security of society be 
built, should enjoy, in their formal pronouncements, 
every possible degree of conclusiveness." The record of 
this decree has been and will be, under continuous exami-
nation, and this decision will raise doubts as to other like 
decrees, which also are under continuous examination. 
Our concern and our appeal here arise because of 
the effect of this decision upon the marketability and the 
mortgageability of real property, where decrees in pro-
bate have been entered, and also because of the added 
inconvenience and costs of determinations caused in these 
fields if final decrees and distribution are not to be relied 
upon. 
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POINT 2. 
A DECREE CANNOT BE SET ASIDE UNTIL ASSAILED 
IN THE MANNER AND WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED 
BY LAW, AND IN AN ACTION AGAINST ALL PARTIES 
WHO WOULD BE AFFECTED BY SETTING IT ASIDE. 
While it does seem important here, as pointed out in 
the petitions for rehearing, that the matter of the validity 
of this judgment was not at all involved in the matter pre-
sented on appeal, and also that this final judgment had 
not been assailed by any pleadings at all, we will merely 
supplement these contentions by calling attention briefly 
to some other basic matters. 
The manner prescribed for assailing a decree is by 
appeal within the time therefor; or, 75-14-23, in the pro-
bate proceedings "before final settlement and discharge 
and after the time by an action in equity, * * *." Rule, 
60(b) as to judgments generally says that "any relief 
from a judgment" after three months "shall be by an in-
dependent action, * * * to relieve a party from a judgment 
* * * for fraud upon the court, * * *." 
As to decrees affecting the title to real property 
in probate matters, 75-1-7, as applicable here, provides 
that where notice of the original appointment of the ad-
ministrator is given, "no objection to any subsequent 
order or decree * * * can be taken # * * on account of any 
* * * defect or irregularity * * * other than on direct 
application * * * at any time before distribution or on 
appeal." While this may not apply so as to prevent an 
equity action based on extrinsic fraud, it does seem to bar 
any objection that might be covered by appellants' peti-
tion here. 
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As is sufficiently stated in the Utah cases above 
cited, any attack upon the decree claiming it to be void 
would necessarily have to be upon pleadings which must 
"set out wherein and why" it is void. 
A matter perhaps of more basic importance in this 
case, is that the parties who would be affected if this de-
cree is finally held to be void are not before the Court 
at all; only the two former administrators appear to 
be parties to this proceeding. 
On this, this Court said in IntermUl v. Nash, 75 P. 2d 
at 161, supra: 
"•(6) The parties to the proceeding may be 
important, because in direct attack, the parties 
to the judgment who would be affected thereby 
must be made parties, as their rights under the 
judgment are directly involved. Borders v. High-
smith, supra; Dunn v. Taylor, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 
241, 94 S.W. 347; Smith v. Perkins, 81 Tex. 152, 
16 S.W. 805, 26 Am. St. Rep. 794; 1 Freeman on 
Judgments, (5th Ed.) Sec. 308." 
Because of this situation, we feel we should call the 
court's attention to the fact that these appellants have 
started another action based on the same claims made 
here in which there are 30 defendants, besides the former 
administrators, all of whom are alleged to have acquired 
or who claim to have some interest in the property dis-
tributed by this decree. We will file herewith a certified 
copy of the complaint in the said action, together with 
sufficient copies for members of the Court. 
It would thus seem that the appellants may not have 
complete confidence in the proceeding here undertaken 
by them, or that this other case may constitute an aban-
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donment of this proceeding. We mention this because 
we too have difficulty in seeing how they can get any 
practical benefit from this proceeding even if, in fact, 
they have not already received under the decree below all 
that they are entitled to receive. And the finding of the 
trial Court was that this $10,000.00 constituted their 
"distributive share" of the estate (R. 252) and "consider-
ing the properties of the decedent" (R. 95) this was a 
"reasonable amount," 
POINT 3. 
WHAT RELIANCE, IF ANY, MAY NOW BE PLACED 
UPON 75-14-25 U.C.A., 1953? 
We mention this point because of the doubt created 
as to this statute. It has had considerable application 
and use in Utah. In fact, in Salt Lake County, printed 
forms of orders, such as those admitting wills to pro-
bate, have for many years contained a clause reciting, 
"and the attorney duly appointed to represent the minor 
heirs consenting," etc. 
The opinion in this matter (270 P. 2d 971) leaves its 
use and application in doubt, because, in one place, it 
appears to approve a recital subscribed by the attorney 
here appointed under this section, as something for 
"safeguarding the rights of these foreign heirs." And 
then referring also to the same document, says: 
"The attorney had no authority to enter into 
any stipulation which would preclude the heirs 
from claiming their share in the estate under the 
laws of succession." 
It then intimates that he may have attempted to so pre-
clude them. Then it says that the attorney "receives his 
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authority only from the Court," and also that the Court 
"can do nothing with the aid of the attorney which it 
could not have done without him." So it is a little con-
fusing, and, if these last two quotes are correct, as the 
statute applies to this case, then not only do they affect 
the interpretation of this statute, but also the interpre-
tation to be given any other of our statutes where the 
Court is authorized to appoint agents to act for certain 
purposes, with the Court's approval; such as referees, 
masters, conservators, administrators and guardians. It 
seems plain that the legislature intended under this sec-
tion to give certain authority to the Court and the attor-
ney, acting together, and that neither was intended to re-
ceive all authority from the other. And that the Court 
can thereby do more with the aid of the attorney, other-
wise our statute is utterly meaningless. The opinion does 
in fact render the statute useless, and this it seems is 
upon the above quotes, which were taken from a case 
dealing with different statutory provisions and with mat-
ters of authority entirely different from those specifi-
cally authorized by our statute and exercised here. 
The authority comes not from the Court, but from 
the legislature. And the authority of the legislature over 
such matters of probate and succession is absolute. 
16 Am. Jur., p. 777: 
"Sec. 12. Legislative Power. — Succession to 
intestate property is at the will of, and subject to, 
the sovereign political power of the state in which 
it is situated. The theory of the law is that any 
participation in the estate of a deceased person is 
by grace of the sovereign political power, which 
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alone has any natural or inherent right to succeed 
to such property." 
This is so basic and so universal as to require no ex-
tensive citation of authority. It has been repeatedly rec-
ognized in this and other States. 
In the case of In re Mower's Estate, 73 P. 2d 967 at 
973, the opinion says: 
"The privilege to dispose of one's property 
by will depends on positive law. The right is with-
in the control of the lawmaking power. State Tax 
Commission v. Backman, 88 Utah 424, 55 P. 2d 
171; Evans v. Price, 118 111. 593, 8 N.E. 854; in re 
Little's Estate, 22 Utah 204, 61 P. 899." 
Did the legislature then authorize the appointed at-
torney and the Court to agree to and approve the par-
tition and distribution as made in the order of February 
23,19451 
The entire essence of what was done, was that each 
of the heirs agreed as to what was the fair share of each 
in this estate, and expressed to the Court his willingness 
to accept such share and asked the Court to approve dis-
tribution on that basis. The Court did approve, after 
first finding that the proposed partition of the estate 
was a fair one. 
That any three, or other number, of heirs may agree 
among themselves to each accept certain properties or 
proportions of an estate upon the Court's approval, is 
indisputable. The only question that might be raised in 
this case is whether the heirs for whom an attorney is 
appointed under 75-14-25 may so agree through him as 
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their representative, when his actions in their behalf 
are approved by the Court, 
The statutory language seems fully to authorize the 
authority here exercised. The appointment was for the 
parties then entitled as heirs to the interests asserted by 
appellants/ and who were the parties entitled by this 
statute to have such representation. 
The statute itself also specifically says that the attor-
ney appointed, "is thereby authorized to represent such 
parties in all such proceedings had subsequent to his 
appointment." "AH such proceedings" refers to and in-
cludes "settlements, partitions and distributions of es-
tates, setting apart homesteads, and all other proceedings 
where notice is required or prescribed, * * V This ap-
pears to cover, as plainly as language can make a statute 
cover, the partition and distribution agreed to and order-
ed here. 
Comparable or similar statutes have been enacted in 
a number of other States, some of which are cited in the 
annotation and others cited in the brief of the parties 
here. Section 15-1513 of the Idaho Code was in 1951, by 
an order of the Supreme Court of Idaho, adopted as a 
rule of procedure for the Courts of Idaho. The constitu-
tionality, wherever attacked, has been upheld, and so far 
as we have found, its language has been given its ordin-
ary meaning and effect. 
It seems correct, too, as pointed out in the petitions, 
that the appointment of the attorney as representative 
of these appellants was not questioned below, and his 
authority under this statute to do what he did was not 
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challenged by allegations there, or by assignment of error 
here. In fact, after the resignation of Mr. Cotro-Manes 
was obtained (E. 173), Mr. Arnovitz was appointed as 
representative of appellants under this same statute and 
was acting under this authority when this appeal was 
taken (E. 175). 
CONCLUSION 
We wish to express appreciation for the privilege of 
filing this brief; and we sincerely urge the Court to re-
consider the decision here, and to take such further action 
Herein as will leave undisturbed the law as to the conclu-
siveness of final judgments of the Courts of this state, 
so that property titles may be safely determined and 
property may be securely held. 
Eespectfully submitted, 
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